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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, Case No. 15307 
vs. 
JAMES W. BRADLEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This was an action brought by the State of Utah 
against the appellant for the offense of criminal homicide in 
violation of Title 76, Section 5, Paragraph 207, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, wherein the appellant was accused 
of causing the death of another person while operating a motor 
vehicle in a negligent manner while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to a jury in Davis County on May 
26 and 27, 1977. The appellant was found not guilty of criminal 
homicide as charged in the information, but was found guilty of 
running a red light, and guilty of driving while under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor. The court sentenced the appellant to a 
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term of six months in the Davis County Jail and to pay a 
f 1ne c 
$299.00, from which the appellant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks reversal of the · d JU gments rendert 
against him or, in the alternative, a remand to the lower cour~ 
for a new trial consistant with due process. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action arose out of an automobile accident whic;. 
occurred on September ll, 1976 at approximately 6:15 P.M. at u,, 
intersection of State Road No. 106 and Center Streets, in Noru 
Salt Lake, Davis County, Utah. State Road No. 106 runs in a 
north-south direction and Center Street runs northeasterly a~ 
southwesterly. The intersection is controlled by a traffic 
light. At approximately ll: 30 A.M. (T. 224) on the morning of: 
accident the appellant arrived at the maintenance shop of the 
construction company for whom he was employed. He testified (1 
that between 11: 30 A.M. and 5:45 P.M. that date, he had consume: 
four or five beers while working on his truck. He left the she: 
shortly before 5:45P.M., travelling several blocks to his bro~ 
in-law's home where he consumed several pieces of chicken (T.ll: 
He then started home, driving south on State Road 106. The 1!~· 
pickup truck he was driving collided with a vehicle eastbound c 
center Street in the intersection of State Road 106 and Center 
Street. The driver of the other vehicle died as a result of 
-2-
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injuries sustained in that accident. u ah 
t Highway Patrol Trooper 
Daryl W. Durrant, testified (T.64) that he arrived at the accident 
scene at approximately 6:22P.M. after having been informed of 
the accident on his radio. Upon arrival at the scene he assisted 
in the removal of the injured parties, and more than one hour 
after the accident he first observed the appellant (T. 82 & 91). 
He testified (T.65) that he noticed an odor of alcohol about the 
appellant and gave the appellant what he referred to as a "field 
sobriety test" (T.66) consisting of several maneuvers in which 
the appellant was asked to stand with his feet and knees together 
with his arms outstretched, close his eyes, and tilt his head 
back. He testified (T.69) the appellant swayed unsteadily. He 
then asked the appellant to perform a finger to nose test with his 
feet and knees together and he testified (T.70) that the appellant 
touched his finger to his upper lip. Officer Durrant then asked 
the appellant to walk an imaginary line, and on command, turn on 
his heel and return to the starting poir.t. He testified (T.71) 
the appellant was walking the line "a fairly good job until he 
turned around" at which time he tended to lose his balance, but 
did not fall. Officer Durrant also asked the appellant (T.71) to 
walk around a flash light which had been placed on the ground in 
an upright position while bent over. He testified (T.72) the 
appellant was able to go around the flash light only twice. 
Trooper Durrant completed his investigation at the accident scene 
and then took the appellant (T.74) to his employer's shop on 
-3-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Cudahy Lane, and then to the Davis County Jail. Trooper Durran: 
asked the appellant at 8:40 P.M. (T. 97) to take a "breathalyzer 
test which was administered to him at 9:50P.M. on the evening 
of the accident. Test results taken on the St evenson Corporatlc 
Breathalyzer, Model 900, reported a reading of .06 and were 
admitted into evidence as Exhibit "I" (T 175) 
· · One prosecution 
witness testified (T.48) she had observed the traffic light was 
green to the traffic on Center Street as she was approaching t~ 
intersection of Center Street and Highway 106 but that shed~~ 
observe the light at the time of the accident (T.49). several 
witnesses fer the defense testified (T. 183, 193, 202, 211) 
that they had observed the appellant just prior to the accident 
and subsequent to the accident, that they did not notice any 
peculiarity in the appellant's coordination or speech, and thu 
in their opinion, he was not "drunk," although he was shaken up. 
Lt. Newell G. Knight of the Utah Highway Patrol testil.· 
(T.l05) that he was the technical supervisor of chemical testin~ 
for the State of Utah. He testified (T.l40) that he had never 
drawn blood, nor had an occasion to be trained in checking blooc 
He also testified (T. 141) that there was nothing in the operatic 
of the breathalyzer that would convert breath alcohol by vol~e 
blood alcohol by weight. Exhibits "H", a checklist for breath~l' 
and "I", breathalyzer results, were offered into evidence and 
were objected to by defense counsel (T.l5l). Trooper Knight 
testified (T. 244) that he had never actually, by his own experie 
run blood samples and that he was only taking somebody else's we 
-4-
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as to what blood alcohol tests ran. He also testified (T.245) 
that the body rids itself of alcohol in a rather predictable 
fashion and that the body loses about one drink an hour, which 
equates to a 12 oz. can of beer (T.246). Trooper Knight was asked 
a ~ypothetical question (T.237) and allowed to testify (T.247) 
as to how much alcohol would be in a person's system after consuming 
4 or 5 beers between 11:30 A.M. and 9:50P.M. 
Dr. Terry H. Rich, Deputy Medical Examiner for the State 
of Utah, testified (T.l59) that he had studied toxicology and the 
metabolism of alcohol in the body. Dr. Rich testified (T.l66) 
that the average body can burn off approximately 9 mililiters 
to 15 mililiters of alcohol per hour and (T.l70) that there was 
a differentiation of 100% between the high and the low metabolism 
rate for alcohol. He further testified (T.l7l)there was no way 
of determining whether an individual, such as the appellant, could 
be at the top range or at the bottom range of metabolism and that 
to do so would be pure speculation. 
Upon conclusion of the testimony the jury was given 
instructions (T.254) as set forth in 41-6-44 Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended and (T.262) that their verdict must be: 
(1) Guilty of criminal homicide, or 
(2) Guilty of driving while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor, a lesser included offense, or 
(3) Guilty of running a red light, a lesser included 
offense, or 
(4) Not guilty. 
-5-
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The jury returned verdicts (R.66, 67, 68, 69) that t 
appellant was guilty of running a red light, gu1lty of driv 1~ 
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and not guu-
of criminal homicide. The court entered an order (R.74) that 
the appellant serve a term of six months in the Davis County 
Jail and pay a fine of $299.00. The appellant appeals that 
judgment. 
-6-
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POINT I 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR A CONVICTION OF 
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL. 
The jury, after deliberating for several hours, found 
the defendant not guilty of autornob;le h · 
• om~cide, 76-5-207, Utah 
Code Annotated, which required finding beyond a reasonable doubt 
the following elements. 
A. The defendant was driving an automobile (which 
is conceded) . 
B. In Davis County, Utah (which is conceded). 
C. That there was simple negligence (the jury found 
the defendant guilty of running a red light. 
D. That the defendant was driving under the influence 
of alcohol (see Instruction No. 6), 41-6-44, Utah 
Code Annotated. 
A review of the evidence shows that several of the 
State's witnesses and all of the defendant's witnesses observed 
the defendant, either immediately before or immediately after the 
accident or both, and none of that testimony suggests that he was 
impaired in any way at the time. (See State witness Mills testi-
mony at T.21, witness Welton, T.39-40, Witness Wentz, T.SO and 
defense witness Lannie Lee Lloyd, T.l85 and 190, MarciaLloyd, 
T.l95-197, Glenn Orvis France, T.204 and George A. Sanders, T.215) 
Officer Durrant, Utah Highway Patrol, gave a series 
of coordination tests more than one hour after the accident that 
-7-
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were not satisfactory to the officer, but f 
rom reading the d 
esc: 
tion of the tests by both Officer Durrant 
and Officer Mills 
' tr., 
tests could not be considered as conclusive · ~n any way' especia: 
with the realization that the defendant had been ·t· wa~ ~ng for o n, 
and one-half hours after a violent accident. 
Some three hours and fifty m;nutes aft th 
• er e accident, 
breathalyzer test was taken at Farmington, Dav;s c t 
• oun y, with a 
.06 percent blood alcohol by weight result. The State attemptec 
to relate this test back to the time of driving, but their 
expert witness, Dr. Terry H. Rich, testified that from his exper. 
ience different persons could vary in metabolism of alcohol by a' 
much as one hundred percent (T. 170) and that an extrapolation ba: 
as to any one individual could be purely speculative (T.l7l). 
Other than the above described items of evidence there 
is no scintilla of evidence that the defendant was driving in ar. 
impaired condition arising from the use of alcohol. 
POINTS II AND III 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBITS H AND I AS THERE 
IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD OF WHAT THE DEFENDANT'S BLOOD ALCOH: 
BY WEIGHT WAS AT THE TIME HE WAS OPERATING THE AUTOMOBILE. 
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY REGARDING 
STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS ARISING FROM BLOOD ALCOHOL BY WEIGHT 
LEVELS AT THE TIME OF DRIVING. 
Points II and III are so interrelated that they are 
discussed together. 
The court, over objection of the defendant (T.l5l~ 
admitted Exhibit H, the breathalyzer check list, and Exhibit I, 
-8-
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the breathalyzer machine result indicator card (T.l?l) and 
instructed the jury with regard to presumptions arising from 
blood alcohol by weight (see Instruction No. 12), which instruc-
tion was duly excepted to by defense counsel (T.284). The court 
further instructed by Instruction 13 (T.258) that the only time the 
presumptions in Instruction 12 were applicable was at the time the 
defendant was driving or in actual control of the motor vehicle. 
The test having been taken between three and one-half 
and four hours after the time of driving, there must necessarily 
be a relation back to the time of driving by expert testimony. 
(41-6-44.10, Utah Code Annotated) 
The Legislature has since this occasion enlarged the 
presumption to hold over for one hour after the time of driving. 
At the time of the crime herein charged there was no such hold-
over period. Furthermore, in the instant case the test was taken 
more than three and one-half hours after any driving by the defendant. 
The State attempted to make this proof by Dr. Terry H. 
Rich, a pathologist, who frankly admitted that under the State's 
hypothetical question, any conclusion he could come to as to the 
status of the blood alcohol by weight at the time of driving would 
be "purely speculative". 
The State then tried to qualify Lt. Newell G. Knight, 
Utah Highway Patrol, who frankly admitted that he had not tested 
blood and further claimed that there was no mechanical basis in the 
-9-
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breathalyzer that converted breath alcohol by volume to blood 
alcohol by weight, but claimed that the transition d 
was rna e by "· 
thing that does that is the phenomena of a color h 
c ange, of dens 
and that's what happens." (T.l41, lines 24-26) 
Despite this, the court allowed Lt. Knight to testi' 
to the effect that a person who had five beers between 11:30 a.~ 
and 9:30 p.m. could not have a .06 percent blood alcohol by Weig: 
reading at 9:30 p.m. The question and answer were properly ob 
]et. 
to ( T • 2 4 4- 5 I . 
The only evidence in the record with regard to ~e 
presumption is Lt. Knight's assumption, erroneously referred to, 
an opinion, that at 9:30 p.m. under the hypothetical question~ 
the defendant's blood alcohol could not have been .06 percent. 
There is no evidence of what it was at the time of 
driving, to wit, 5:45 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. Under the circumstances. 
giving the presumption instruction to the jury is reversible errc 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant urges the court to make a thorough revie• 
of the record and in view of the entire absence of evidence as tc 
the defendant's condition at the time of the accident, and duet: 
the lack of adequate testimony or any relation back to the time 
of driving on the breath test, further on the basis that the cour 
instructed the jury as to presumptions when there was no basis tc 
-10-
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under Instruction No. 13 for relation back. 
Defendant prays the court to reverse the verdict and 
judgment as to the charge of driving under the influence of 
intoxicants and remand the case back to the lower court under the 
misdemeanor charge only. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DONALD R. WILSON 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
I certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Defendant-Appellant were delivered to Robert B. Hansen, Attorney 
General of Utah, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
this 13th day of January, 1978. 
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